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NEGLIGENCE IN IMMINENT PERIL.
THE well-settled rule of contributory negligence that a person
cannot recover, if it appear that by the want of ordinary care and
prudence on his part, he contributed to the injury, or if, by the
exercise of ordinary care, he might have prevented the injury, is
subject to recognised limitations. One of such limitations is, that
if the plaintiff, without fault, is placed, by want of care of the
defendant, in such a position that, at the moment and in the
face of great and threatening peril, he is obliged to choose between
two hazards, and he makes such choice as a person of ordinary prudence and care placed in the same situation might make and is.
thereby injured, the fact that if he had chosen the other hazard he.
would have escaped injury, will not relieve the defendant from lia,bility for his own neglect: ifaff v. M. & St. L. B ., 14 Fed. Rep..
558; Collins v. Davidson, 19 Ill. 83; -PennsylvaniaCo. v. Righler,
42 N. J. L. 180; Stokes v. Saltonstall, 13 Pet. 181; Siegrist v.
Arnot, 10 Mo. App. 197; Mark v. St. P., H. & H. Rd., 3a
Minn. 493; Gurry v. C., M. & St. P. Rd., 52 Ia. 672;. Sehalt
v. Cole, 107 Penn. St. 1; Fowler v. B. & 0. By., 18 W. Va.
579: Lowery v. Manhattan By., 99 N. Y. 158; -N. T., V. &
Ga. Rd. v. Gurley, 12 Lea 46; P., C. St. L. Rd. v. Mllartin,
82 Ind. 476; Rd. Co. v. Mowery, 36 Ohio St. 418; Penn. Rd.
v. Werner, 89 Penn. St. 59; Wilson v. _N. P. Ry., 26 Minn. 278;
I., B. & W. Rd. v. Oarr,35 Ind. 510; _Dyer v. Erie Ry., 7.1 N. Y.
229; .'. C. Rd. v. .Yeubeur, 62 Md. 3U1 ; Wesley Coal Co. v.
.Healer, 84 Ill. 126; Larrabee v. Sewall, 66 Me. 376 ;-Stevenson
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v. C. & A. Rd., 18 Fed. Rep. 493; 5 McCrary 634; MeKinney
v. Neil, 1 McLean 540; Coulter v. Am. .Exp.Co., 56 N. Y. 585;
Buel v. N. Y. C. Rd., 31 Id. 314; Bucher v. Rd., 98 Id. 128;
T., W. &TW. Rd. v. O'Connor, 79 Ill. 391; Voak v. N. C. Rd.,
75 N. Y. 320; Johnson v. West Chester Rd., 70 Penn. St. 357;
Lawless v. Conn. R. Rd., 136 Mass. 1; The B. B. Saunders, 25
Fed. Rep. 727; The Genesee Chief, 12 How, 461; The Dexter,
23 Wall. 69, 76 ; The -Elizabeth Jones, 112 U. S. 514, 526 ; I.,
B. 6- W. Rd. v. Carr, 35 Ind. 510; Mark v. Hudson B. Bridge
Co., 56 How. Pr. 108 ; Wesley City Coal Co. v. Healer, 84 Ill.
126; B. T., .& G. Rd. v. Clark, 74 Ala. 443; B. & 0. Rd.
v. Trainor, 33 Md. 542; Sullivan v. Bridge Co., 9 Bush 81; Cottrill v. Rd., 47 Wis. 637.
Lord EuLLNBOROUG said, in Jones v. Boyce, 1 Stark. 402, "If
I place a man in such a situation that he must adopt a perilous
alternative, I am responsible for the consequences." To like effect,
Chief Baron KELLY, in Siner v. G. W. By., L. R., 3 Ex. 150;
The Bywell Castle, L. R., 4 P. D: 219.
Or, in other words, where a party has given another reasonable
cause for alarm he cannot complain that the person so alarmed has
not exercised cool preseice of mind, and thereby find protection
from responsibility resulting from the alarm: Wesley City Coal Co.
v. Healer, 84 fll. 126.
Nor is there any rule of law which imposes it upon one over
whom danger depends by the neglect of another to incur greater
danger by delaying his efforts to avoid it until its exact nature and
measure can be ascertained. An instinctive effort on the part of
such person to avoid the danger, will not relieve the other from responsibility for his negligence: Lowery v. ManhattanBy., 99 N. Y.
158; Coulter v. Am. -Exp.Co., 56 Id. 585; Larrabee v. Sewall,
66 Me. 376.
The limitation of the rule stated is enforced under the varying
circumstances justifying its application. It is, in effect, incorporated into the maritime law of all civilized nations, and in the
United States, under Rev. Stats. 1878, sect. 4233, as amended by
23 Stats. at Large, p. 442, it is provided that in obeying and construing the rules of navigation governing the movements of vessels,
contained in the act, "due regard shall be had to all dangers of navigation, and to any special circumstances which may render a departure from such rules necessary in order to avoid immediate danger."
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The limitation is generally applied to errors of navigation by vessels made in extremis in attempting to avoid an impending collision.
The limitation also applies to acts of passengers or employees on
railroad locomotives or trains, in jumping from moving trains, done
under the alarm caused by a collision of trains which is taking place
or is likely to occur; and of travellers driving or on foot on public
highways, when in danger, by the defendant's negligence, of collision, at a railroad crossing, with an approaching train, or upon public streets in a city, and of employees in manufactories or shops, and
in other varying circumstances which, with the qualification of such
limitation, will be considered in their order.
Collions of Vessels.- The rule in Admiralty.-The general
rule in admiralty, as declared by the Supreme Court of the United
States, in several cases, is, that where a vessel has, either wholly or
partly, by her own fault or mismanagement, placed another vessel
in a position of extreme danger, the other ship will be excused, if
in the moment of peril and excitement, in an effort to avoid the
impending collision, she makes an error in judgment in manoeuvres,
contributing to, or inducing a collision: !Phe .ElizabethJones, 112
U. S. 514, 526 ; The Genesee Chief, 12 How. 461 ; . Y. & L.
Steamship Co. v. Rumball, 21 Id. 372, 883; The Favorita, 18
Wall. 603; The Falcon, 19 Id. 75; The Nichols, 7 Id. 656, 666;
The Carroll,8 Id. 302; The Dexter, 23 Id. 69, 76. Also by federal courts in collision cases : The Royal Arch, 22 Fed. Rep. 457;
Te E. B. Ward,Jr., 23 .Id- 900 ; The Standard,Id. 207 ; The
George Murray, 22 Id. 117, 123; The Nereus, 23 Id. 458; The
B. B. Saunders, 25 Id. 727; Collins v. Davidson, 19 Id. 83;
The John Mitchell, 12 Id. 511; Orhanovich v. The America, 4
Id. 837 ; The Alaska, 22 Id. 548 ; The Lavergne, 2 Id. 788; The
Merrimac, 2 Sawy. 586 ; Bartlett v. Williams, 1 Holmes 229;
Peek v. Burns, 5 Den. 537 ; The J.
.Gautier,Id. -469 ; The
-ElmCity, 6 Id. 58; The General William AeCandless, Id. 223;
The Manhasset, Id. 301. As said by Judge MOCRARY, in Collin&
v. Davison, supra, "In the case of sudden and unexpected peril,
endangering human life, and causing unnecessary excitement, the
law makes allowances for the circumstance that there is but little
time for deliberation, and holds a party accountable only for such
care as an ordinarily prudent man would have exercised under similar circumstances."
The rule applies to all cases where the situation is such that, all
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the circumstances being considered, a reasonable doubt might exist
as to the best course to be pursued to avoid a collision on the part
of those in charge of the vessel in a dangerous situation: The
Nfereu8, 23 Fed. Rep. 448, 458. But a vessel which gives a signal
to another vessel for a departure from the ordinary rules of navigation assumes the hazards of the consequences of making such a
departure, whether she hears a response to the signal or not: The
B. B. Saunders, 25 Fed. Rep. 727 ; The St. John, 7 Blatchf. 220 ;
and where a steamer, under no constraint of circumstances, proposes
such departure, requiring on the part of the other vessel strong and
immediate measures to avoid collision, an error of judgment made
by the latter, in a moment of peril is no defence: The .Nereus, 23
Fed. Rep. 456. So, where a vessel, instead of following such rules
causes damage by a mistaken: manceuvre calculated on chance, she
is responsible: The Mtan, 23 Fed. Rep. 413, 416. A change of
course on the part of a vessel which complied with the rules
of navigation until a collision became apparently inevitable by the
fault of the other, is not a fault when made at a moment of
extreme peril, and is allowable as an act in.extremis, although if not
made, there might have been no collision: The -E.B. Ward, Jr.;
23 Fed. Rep. 900 ; The George Murray,22 Id. 123. The rule
as stated by the English Court of Appeals in the Admiralty Court
in the leading case of The Bywell Castle, L. R., 4 Pr. D. 219,
where the libelled vessel in a collision changed her course when, as
said by Chief Justice JAMEs, she was "in her very agony," is, that
where a ship has, by wrong meneouvres, placed another ship in a
position of extreme peril, that other ship will not be held to
blame if, in that moment of extreme peril and difficulty she
happens to do something wrong, and is not manceuvred with
perfect presence of mind, accurate judgment and promptitude.
"Although," added Lord COTTON, "those before whom the case
comes to be adjudicated, with a knowledge of all the facts, are able
to see that the course adopted was in fact not the best."
Oollion of _ailroad Trains.-The limitation of the doctrine
of contributory negligence referred to, applies, also, to passengers
upon railroad trains. The rule is applied especially in ca~es where
collisions of railroad trains have taken place or are likely to occur,
and the passenger is injured while leaping therefrom. It may thus
be regarded as settled law that where a passenger is riding upon a
railroad train and a collision has taken place or is likely to occur,
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and in the excitement of the moment, in presence of impending
peril, without time for deliberation, he is obliged to choose between
two hazards, and makes such choice as a person of ordinary care and
prudence would make under like circumstances, and by reason thereof
he is exposed to greater peril, and injured, he is entitled to recover,
the railroad company not being relieved from liability for its own
negligence by the fact that the instinctive act of escape from imminent peril by jumping from a moving train was very hazardous
and in law negligent, and that had he chosen the other hazard
the injury would have been avoided: N. & U.RCd. v. _Erwin, 3 Am.
& Eng. R. R. Cas. 465; Twornley v. C., P., N. J. B. By., 69
N. Y. 158 Buel v. N. Y. C. Rd., 81 Id. 314; Bldridge v. Long
Island Rd., 1 Sandf (N. Yo) 89; Collins v. Rd. Co., 12 'Barb.
493; Plopper v. Rd. Co., 13 Hun 625; Southwestern Rd. v.
Paulk, 24 Ga. 356; Wilson v. N. P. Rd., 26 Minn. 278; .Hill v.
N. 0. & C. W. Rd., 11 La. Ann. 292; Rd. Co. v. A&pell, 73
Penn. St. 149; Knapp v. S. C. & P. Rd., 18 Am. & Eng. R. R.
(as. 60. See Lowery v. Manhattan Ry., 99 N. Y. 158, 162.
The rule was applied where a passenger fearing a collision from
an approaching train, left his seat to go out of the train, believing
by so doing he could better avoid the danger, and although his act
contributed to his injury, it was held no defence to his action: Iron
Co.v. lfowery, 36 Ohio 418. And also, where, a collision impending,
the conductor called to the passengers to jump, and himself set the
example: Southwestern By. v. -Paulk,24 Ga. 356 ; or where they
followed a brakeman.- Filerv. New York Central & H1. . Rd., 68
N. Y. 124 ; -Pittsburgh,B. & W. Rd. Co. v. Bohrman, 12 Am. &
Eng. R. R. Cas. 170.
The rule as to Employees.-A distinction is properly drawn
between the circumstances which may justify a passenger in fear of
an impending collision, to jump from a moving train, and the like
act of an employee, such as an engineer. The former has only
his own personal safety in question, while such employee has in
his charge the lives and property of all the passengers and employees on the train. The passenger is also unskilled in the running of trains, and as to the imminence of the danger of collision.
The engineer, however, knows from experience how soon a train
can be stopped, and the danger of risk of collision as judged from
the distances between the approaching trains. To justify jumping
from his engine in such circumstances, there must be such an im-
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minent emergency upon him as requires him to do it; for what
would be no fault in the passenger might be gross negligence in
the officers of the train: CentralBd. v. Roach, 64 Ga. 685. Where,
however, a collision was rendered inevitable by the negligence of
the employer in retaining an incompetent servant, it was held where
an engineer jumped from his engine, that, "if in the excitement
of the moment, the deceased lost his own presence of mind, and
adopted a mode of self-preservation, which proved most unfortunate
for him, it was no excuse to the company, whose negligence in employing or retaining an incompetent servant caused the disaster :"
-E. T., . d C. Rd. v. aurley, 12 Lea 46.
.The limitation also applies in favor of an employee, where, in
the course of his employment, in a position of imminent peril, by
the negligence of the employer, he adopts, in the terror of the
moment, an unsafe course exposing him to greater peril: Sciall
v. Cole, 107 Penn. St. 1; Cumz v. Rd., 52 Wis. 672; Schultz v.
Chicago &' N. W. Bd., 44 Id. 638; Mark v. St. P., H. 6 H. Rd.,
30 Minn. 493; Stevenson v. Chicago &. A. By., 18 Fed. Rep. 498;
Lalor v. Chicago, B. & Q. Rd., 52 Ill. 401 ; Bell v. Hannibal
St. J. Rd., 72 Mo. 50.
In Schall v. Cole, supra, where the employee unexpectedly found
himself in a position of imminent peril in which there was no time
for reflection, by reason of the breaking of a part of a machine, the
court say: "Assuming it to be true that he might have escaped
had he not paused to look after his machine, such an error of judgment at such a time ought not to prevent a recovery." And, in
a similar case of imminent peril, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin,
in Schultz v. Chicago & N. W. Rd., supra, held that "it would be
most absurd and unjust to hold him negligent because the instinct
of self-preservation did not suggest a more effectual method of
escape from peril."
Collisions at Railroad Croseings.-A traveller, on a highway or
a city street, approaching a railroad crossing where the fiew of the
track is by any means obstructed so as to render it impossible or
difficult to learn the approach of a train, or where there are conflicting circumstances calculated to deceive or throw him off his
guard, and who is obliged to act upon his judgment at the moment
of peril, caused by the defendant's negligence, in failing to give
signals, and who, under such circumstances, acts as would a person
of ordinary intelligence, will be entitled to recover, although at the
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last moment he be guilty of an error of judgment in his attempting
to avoid collision with the approaching train : Hart v. Devereux,
41 Ohio St. 565; Penn. Rd. v. Werner, 89 Penn. St. 59; Kelly
v. St. P., HM. & At Rd., 29 Minn. 1; Brownell v. T. & B. Rd.,
55 Vt. 218; Rosenberger v. G. T. By., 8 Ont. App. 482; aff. 9
Sup. Ct. Can. 311; Copley v. N. 17. & N. Rd., 136 Mass. 6;
Gont. Imp. Co. v. Stead, 95 U. S. 161; Plummer v. Eastern Rd.,
73 Mle. 591 ; Penn. Rd. v. Coon, 17 W. N. C. 137 ; P. & B. Rd.
v. Killips, 88 Penn. St. 405; Penn. Rd. v. Beale, 73 Id. 504;
Bunting v. Rd. Go., 14 Nev. 351; L. & G. L. Rd. v. Goetz., 79
Ky. 442; C., B. & Q. Rd. v. Lee, 87 Ill. 454; P. J- P. Rd. v.
Clayberg, 107 Ill. 644; Johnson v. Rd. Co., 77 Mo. 546; Richey
v.R d., 7 Mo. App. 150; Zimmerman v. Rd. Co., 71 Mo. 476;
Gaynor v. Rd. Co., 100 Mass. 208 ; (,iaffe6 v. Rd. Co., 104 Id.
108; -Pollock v. Rd. Co., 124 Id. 158; Kissenger v. Rd. Co., 56
N. Y. 538 ; W., St. L. & P. Rd. v. Cent. Trust Co., 23 Fed. Rep.
738; Cosgrove v. Rd. Co., 87 N. Y. 88; Salter v. Rd., 88 Id. 42;
s. c. 75 Id. 273; Cordell v. Rd., 70 Id. 119; Dolan v. Del, &
. Canal Co., 71 Id. 285 ; B. & 0. Rd. v. Whitaere, 35 Ohio St.
627; Schierhold v. Rd., 40 Cal. 447; Penn. Rd. v. Afatthews,
36 N. J. L. 531; Gothardv. Rd., 67 Ala. 114; Nehrbas v. Rd.,
62 Cal. "320; Faber v. Rd., 29 Minn. 465; Trout v. Rd., 23
Gratt. 619; H. & T. C. Rd. v. Wilson, 60 Tex. 142; Punston v.
Rd., 61 Ia. 452; Skelton's Case, L. R., 2 C. P. 631; Bilbee v.
L. 4 B. By., 18 C. B. N. S. 584. Even in the absence of statutory requirement to give signals: Artz v. C., R. I. &"P. Rd., 34
Iowa 153; Funston v. C., B. I. & P. Rd., 61 Id. 452; Bilert v.
Rd., 48 Wis. 606.
And also at private crossings where the same have been opened
to the use of the public: Webb v. Rd., 57 Me. 117; P., . W. &"
C. By. v. Dunn, 56 Penn. St. 280; Delany v. Rd., 83 Wis. 67;
Thomas v. Rd., 8 Fed. Rep. 729; S.c. 19 Blatchf. 533; Barry
v. Rd.. 92 N. Y. 289; Delaney v. Pd., supra; Jamison v. Rd.,
55 Cal. 593; Murphy v. Rd., 133 Mass. 121. Even where the
company had put up a sign "This is not a public way, and is dangerous :" O'Connorv. B. & L. Bd., 135 Mass. 352; ill. Gent. Rd.,
v. _relka, 110 II1. 498.
A traveller upon a street in a city, where the speed of trains has
been regulated by city ordinance, may presume that the company
will comply with such regulation, and if, acting in accordance with
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such presumption, in the absence of knowledge that the train approaching was exceeding that speed, he will be excused, in case of
collision, if by reason of haste, when placed in a position of impending peril, by the defendant's negligence, he makes a mistake: Hart
v. Devereux, 41 Ohio St. 565; Neek v. Pennsylvania Co., 38 Id.
632; -E. T., V7. & C. Rd. v. Clark, 74 Ala. 448. He also may
presume that a proper lookout will be kept in backing locomotives
or cars across streets: L., N., A. & C. Bd. v. Head, 80 Ind. 117;
G. H. & H. Bd. v. Moore, 59 Tex. 64; Gov: St. Ry. v. Hanlon,
53 Ala. 83; S'cwier v. N.Y. C. & H. R. Bd., 90 N. Y. 558.
And where, in obedience to signals or acts of the company's servants at crossings, a traveller places himself in a position of imminent danger of collision, he can recover: _Pushing v. Sharp, 96
N. Y. 676; Peek v. M. 0. Rd. (Mich. 1885), 19 Am. & Eng. Rd.
Cas. 259; Bay]ley v. -EasternRd., 125 Mass. 62; Sweeny v. Old
Col. Ry., 10 Allen 868; Borst v. L., S. & M. S. Rd., 4 Hun
846 ; Dolan v. D. & H. Canal Co., 71 N. Y. 285 ; P. & 0. Rd. v.
Mahone, 63 Md. 188.
The limitation of the rule stated was enforced in C.
V Rd.
W.
v. Miller, 46 Mich. 532. The court (Oh. J. MARSTON), in stating
the rule said: "If the neglect of the company to sound a whistle,
when approaching the highway, permitted the plaintiff to drive into
a dangerous position under circumstances which allowed him no time
for reflection, and he, acting upon the spur of the moment in his
efforts to avoid the danger, made a mistake, and took what subsequent cool deliberate investigation might show to have been wrong,
and that some other course would have been better if not absolutely safe, yet he cannot be charged with contributory negligence
because of such error of judgment under such dangerous circumstances." And in a late case in Mass. (Tyler v. N. J N. B. Rd.,
137 Mass. 238), arising under similar circumstances, the court held
that while "the plaintiff was bound to use reasonable care to avoid
getting into a position in which he could not escape a collision, the
fact that he did find himself there in such a position was not conclusive evidence that he was there by his own negligence :" Mayo v.
Railroad Co., 104 Mass. 137. In that case, even the defendant,
did not claim that the act of the traveller, in presence of the imminent peril of collision, although'negligent, was a defence; and, in
Schum .v. Penn. By., 107 Penn. St. 8, where the view of the road
was obscured until about ten yards from the track, and then only
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fifty yards of the track could be seen, the train running forty miles
an hour, and giving no signals, and the plaintiff's intestate was
killed, the court announced that "as matter of law, a man may
fairly be presumed to see what he can see when it is his duty to see
it, but he cannot be presumed to see at a particular time what is
not shown to have been visible at that time." Nor is a degree of
care amounting to the utmost coolness and discretion required of
travellers finding themselves in positions of peril, by reason of impending collisions caused by the view of the approaching train,
being prevented by obstructions placed by the defendant, no signals having been given: Nehrbas v. Rd., 62 Cal. 330; Bd. Co.
v. Sponier, 85 Ind. 165; M.cDermott v. Rd., 28 Hun 325 .Mackay v. Rd., 35 N. Y. 75; Dimick v. Rd., 80 Ill. 338 ; Rd. v.
Lee, 87 Id. 454. And it may be negligence per se on the part
of a railroad to have a crossing so obstructed that if the plaintiff
"had got out and led his horse on the track, the result would
have probably been the loss of his own life as well as that of the
horse :" Penn. Bd. v. Ackerman, 74 Penn. St. 265. Nor is it
required of travellers on the highway to measure time and distance
with exactness as they approach a crossing, although upon a subsequent measurement byan experienced engineer it may be discovered
that an engine might have been seen at certain points in the highway: Hutchinsonv. St. P., . & H. Rd., 82 Minn. 398; nor was it
any defence that a girl might have been misled as to distance
where she had got to within four or five feet of the track, at a city
street crossing, without seeing or hearing a train, and then, being
startled by sudden and sharp whistles and seeing the flashing headlight of an engine, in the terror of the moment, without time for
reflection, started to run across the track, in front thereof, and was
injured: Copley v. NW. H. & NT. Rd., 136 Mass. 6. So, also, a
traveller can recover where, having a right to presume that a railroad company will not exceed the rate of speed prescribed by ordinance, and acting upon such presumption, without knowledge that
the rate was being exceeded, was injured while attempting to
escape from the perilous position, in which he had been placed
by the defendant's negligence: Hart v. Devereux, 4i Ohio St. 565;
Meek v. Pennsylvania Co., 38 Id. 632; E. T., V.Rd. v.
Clark, 74 Ala. 443.
Jumping off a moving Train at Stations.-A passenger upon a
railroad train who, by the culpable negligence of a corporation,

a.
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through its officers, is induced to leave a train while moving slowly,
it having arrived at his destination, but not being entirely stopped,
is entitled to recover, for, being called upon to act in a sudden
.emergency caused by the defendant's negligence, he will not be
held to the most rigid accountability for his actions: Bucher v.
Rd., 98 N. Y. 128; Filer v. N. Y. C. Rd., 49 Id. 51; -Ernstv.
_ d., 37 Id.
Hudson River By., 35 Id. 38 ; McIntyre v. N Y.
287; G., H. & S. A. Rd. v. Smith, 59 Tex. 406; Penn. Rd.v.
McOlosey, 23 Penn. St. 526; Georgia By. Co. v. McCurdy, 45
Ga. 288, in which it is said, "it is not a want of ordinary care for
a passenger to use the means the company affords him to get off a
train :" Straus v. Rd., 75 Mo. 185; Fickers v. Rd., 64 Ga. 806;
Olotworthy v. Hf. . St. J. Rd., 80 Mo. 220; Boss v. Rd., 15 R. I.
185; X. & L. B. Rd. v. Stringfellow, 44 Ark. 32; T. & P. Rd.
v. Garcia, 62 Tex. 285; Kelly v. Bd., 70 Mo. 604; Nelson v.
Rd., 68 Id. 593; Ohio 4. H. R. Rd. v. Schiebe, 44 Ill. 460; Edgar
v. By., 11 Upp. Can. App. 452; Siner v. Rd., L. R., 3 Exch. 150,
155; Rd. v. Krouse, 30 Ohio St. 222; Ill. Cent. Rd. v. Able, 59
Ill. 131; P., B. f. W. Rd. v. Rohrman, 12 Am. & Eng. Rd. Cas.
176. Or where passing from one car to another while in motion,
upon the directions of the employees of the train, there being no
knowledge that such obedience would lead to danger: L. &.N. Bd.
v. Kelly, 92 Ind. 371. The rule applies where a conductor gives
a signal for a train to start, while passengers are getting off of
the train, at a station, without notice to them: Brooks v. Rd., 135
Mass. 21 ; Rathbone v.. Union By., 13 R. I. 709 ; Bucher v.
Rd., 98 N. Y. 128; Sraus v. Rd., 75 Mo. 185; Bd. v. Krouse,
88 Ohio St. 222.
The rule applied to Stage-Coaches and other Flehicles.-The
rule referred to ante-dated railroads, for the situation of imminent
peril that will excuse a person for jumping from a railroad train
in motion will equally excuse him where he leaps from a coach or
other vehicle while in motion. In the leading case-Stocea v. Saltonstall, 13 Pet. 181-where a passenger jumped from a stage,
fearing that it would overturn, the court stated the rule: "It is
sufficient, if he was placed, by the misconduct of the defendant, in
such a situation as obliged him to adopt one alternative, leap or
remain in certain -peril: Haff v. Rd., 14 Fed. Rep. 558; McKinney v. Nere, 1 McLean 540 ; ingalls v. Bills, 9 Mete. 1; Seigrist v. Arnot, 10 Mo. App. 197; -yer v. Erie By., 71 N. T.
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228 ; and in Jones v. Boyce, I Stark. 402, the leading English
case, Lord ELLE1B00ROUGn, says: "If I place a man in such a
position that he must adopt a perilous alternative, I am responsible
for the consequences."
As to occurrences on Streets.-The limitation of the rule of
negligence stated is also applied to occurrences on public streets
in cities and towns. In a late case in the New York Court of
Appeals-Lowery v. Manhattan_
By., 99 N. Y. 158-where, by
the fail of fire from a locomotive on the defendant's road, the plaintiff was injured, the court (Judge MILLER), say: "The driver
was passing along in pursuit of his customary business driving his
horse, when suddenly the falling of the fire upon himself and the
horse placed him in a position of great danger, and he was justified
in attempting to save his own life and protect himself from injury.
If he made a mistake in his judgment, the company was not relieved from liability." The same rule was applied in earlier cases,
Wasmer v. -Delaware,L. & W. Rd., 80 N. Y. 212, and Coulter
v. Am. ff. U. Exp. Co., 56 N. Y. 585, and also in Larrabee v.
Sewall, 66 Me. 376.
A presumption prevails in favor of the foot traveller on the street
that he will not, without fault, be placed in peril; and, therefore, it
is not negligent for him, in the absence of notice of danger, to permit his attention to be drawn from the spot upon which he is about
to step, extraordinary vigilance not being required of him : Houston
v. Traphagen, 47 N. J. L. 23; Philbrik v. Niles, 25 Fed. Rep.
265; Coulter v. Am. Ht. U. Exp. Co., 56 N. Y. 585.
The rule was also applied to a highway, where a traveller, owing
to the negligence of the defendant, was exposed to peril by a precipice left unguarded: Pittsburgh, 0.
. Rd. v. Moses, 17 W.
N. C. 76.
Limitation of rule, when avoided.-It is necessary, however,
that the situation of peril in which the plaintiff is placed, in order
to make his act while there an excusable error of judgment, must
be the result of the negligence of the defendant: Tie Elizabeth
Jones, 112 U. S. 514, 526. Where, therefore, the plaintiff has,
by his own negligence, placed himself in a position of known peril,
or where the act of the plaintiff causing his injury resulted from a
rash apprehension of danger which did not exist, then, although
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in the excitement and confusion, he makes a mistake in his attempt
to escape from impending peril, and is exposed to greater danger,
the consequences of such mistake cannot be visited upon the defendant, for no degree of presence of mind nor want of it has anything to do with the case, as it was negligence to be there: Merrill
v. EasternRd., 139 Mass. 238; B. & P. Rd. v. Jones, 95 U. S.
439; Stokes v. iSaltonstall, 13 Pet. 181 ; Collins v. Davidson, 19
Fed. Rep. 83; Kresanowski v. Rd., 18 Id. 229; Player v. Rd.,
62 Ia. 723; L. R. & F. S. Rd. v. Miles, 40 Ark. 298; Bucker
v. Rd., 61 Tex. 499; Penn. Rd. v. Langdon, 92 Penn. St. 21;
Gardner v. Rd., 51 Conn. 143; Hickey v. Rd., 14 Allen 429 ;
Ken. Cent. Ry. v. Thomas, 79 Ky. 160; Waterbury v. Rd., 21
Blatchf. 314; 17 Fed. Rep. 671; Abend v. Rd., 111 Ill. 202;
Rd. v. Michie, 83 Id. 427; Hoar v. Rd., 70 Me. 65; Deville v.
Southern Pao.Ry., 50 Cal. 383 ; B. & H. R. Rd. v. Rose, 11 Keb.
177; Eaton v. Rd., 57 N. Y. 382; Siegrist v. Arnot, 10 Mo.
App. 197. The rule applied in admiralty cases: The Free State,
91 U. S. 200; The General U. S. Grant, 6 Ben. 465; Sherman
v. Mott, 5 Id. 372; The Adriatic, 107 U. S. 512; The Pilot, 20
Fed. Rep. 860; The Beanora, 17 Blatchf. 88; The Rosedale, 22
Fed. Rep. 737; The Bermuda, 10 Ben. 693; Winter v. Winnett,
1 Holmes 465; The Blectra, 6 Ben. 189; The P. W. Gifford, 7
Biss. 249.
Although circumstances may arise where a person may, voluntarily and without actual necessity, expose himself to danger, and
still not be chargeable with contributory negligence: Jeffrey v.
RBd, 56 Iowa 546; Pool v. Rd., 53 Id. 657; -Lawlessv. Rd., 136
Mass. 1; Thomas v. W. U. Tel. Co., 100 Id. 156 ; Mahoney v.
Metropolitan Rd., 104 Id. 73.
The rule stated is applied to accidents from collisions at railroad crossings. The consensus of judicial opinion in the federal
and state courts is, recognising that a railroad crossing is a
dangerous place, that a traveller who drives or walks upon a
railroad track, without taking any precaution whatever, either to
stop, look both ways, or listen for an approaching train, and is
injured, is guilty of negligence in law, although the company.
omitted to give the statutory signals, and that the traveller, in
his confusion, in the excitement of the moment, rushed more
heedlessly into greater peril: Scho eld v. C., A. & St. P. Rd.,
8 Fed. Rep. 488; Cont. Imp. Co. v. Stead, 95 U. S. 161; Thomas
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v. Rd., 8 Fed. Rep. 729; 19 Blatchf. 538; Tucker v. Duncan, 9
Fed. Rep. 867; Wheelwright v. B. & A. Rd., 135 Mass. 225;
Chaffee v. B. & 13. Rd., 104 Id. 108; Tully v. FitchburgBy., 134
Id. 499; a case of deaf-mute: Ormsbee v. B. P.P. Rd. Corp., 14
R. I. 102, 108; . 0. Rd. v. Mitchell, 52 Miss. 808; Laverenz
v. U., R. . &-P. Rd., 56 Iowa 689; Cjurtin v. C., R. I &
.P: Rd., 57 Id. 816; Benton v. Gent. Rd., 42 Id. 192; P., 0.
& St. -L. Rd. v. Yundt, 78 Ind. 873; S. c .. Ala. Rd. v.
Thompson, 62 Ala. 494; Wilds v. Hf. R. Rd., 24 N. Y. 430;
Belton v. Baxter, 54 Id. 246; Wendell v. N. Y. C. & 1. R.
Rd., 91 Id. 420; Connelly v. Rd., 88 Id. 346; Parkerv. W. &.
TV. Rd., 86 N. 0. 221; P. & R. Rd. v. Boyer, 97 Penn. St. 91;
Penn. Rd. v. .Fortney, 90 Id. 824; R. & C. Rd. v. Ritchie, 102
Id. 425; Moody v. The P. Ry., 68 Mo. 470; Mahlan v. Rd., 49
Mich. 585; Penn. Co. v. Righter, 42 N. J. L. 180; Telfer v. N.
Rd., 30 Id. 188; H. & E. Rd. v. Haslan, 33 Id. 147; Murray v. Rd., 81 La. Ann. 490; C. &N. W. Rd. v. Dimick, 96 Ill.
42; C., B. & Q. Rd. v. Damerell, 81 Id. 450; . & N. W. Rd.
v. Hatch, 79 Id. 137; Abbett v. Rd., 80 Minn. 482; especially,
where knowing of the immediate proximity of the train: Kelley
v. Rd., 75 Mo. 138; Pakalinskyv. N. Y. C. & H. R. Rd., 82 N. Y.
424; Ernst v. Rd., 85 Id. 9; .Palys v. Zie Ry., 30 N. J. Eq.
604; Parker v. W. & W. Rd., 86 N. 0. 221; or where using a
private crossing: Johnson v. L. - N. Rd. (Ky. 1883) 13 Am. &
Eng. Rd. Cas. 623; Cordell v. N. . C. . H. R. Rd., 75 N. Y.
830. And it is held necessarily fatal to an action, if a traveller
approaches a dangerous crossing at such speed as to be unable to
stop his horses before getting on the track, as he does it At his own
peril of being injured by a collision with an approaching train.
In doing so, he not only rashly risks his own life and property, but
puts into jeopardy the lives of the passengers and employees on the
approaching train: Tucker ' v. Duncan, 4 Woods 652 ; Wilds v.
H. R. Rd., 24 N. Y. 430 ; Grippen v. N. . C. Rd., 40 Id. 81;
Haring v. N. Y. & -EeRy., 13 Barb. 9; Glendening v. Sharp,
22 Hun 78; Salter v. U. P. Rd., 13 Id. 18T; Mantel v. C.,
M. & St. P. Rd., 33 Minn. 62; U. P. Ry. v. Adams, 38 Kan.
427; Fletcherv. A. & P. Rd., 64 Mo. 484; Benton v. Central Ry.,
42 Iowa 193 ; 1. S. & U.S. Rd. v. Miller, 25 Mich. 274; Grows
v. M.L. Ry., 67 Me. 100; W., St. -L. & P. Ry. v. Hicks, 13 Ill. App.
407; especially, where driving a horse at the rate of a mile in four
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minutes: lemning v. W. P. Ry., 49 Cal. 253. Even where a
traveller, driving at a brisk trot, trusted to the statutory signals to
warn him of an approaching train: Turner v. Hf. & St. J. Rd., 74
Mo. 603. But in a late case, Tyler v. N. Y. & N. B. Rd., 137
Mass. 238, in which it was claimed that the plaintiff had no right
to go so near the track that he could not stop before reaching it,
until he had assured himself there was no danger, the court (W.
ALLEN, J.), said: "The true proposition is, that the plaintiff was
bound to use reasonable care to avoid getting into a position in
which he could not escape a collision. The fact that he did not
find himself in such a position is not conclusive evidence that he
was there by his own negligence. * * * Whether he used due care
to know if a train was coming, and to be in a condition to avoid it,
were questions which depended upon inferences of fact to be found
by the jury." The employees of the company may act upon the
presumption that a traveller seen approaching a railroad crossing
will not heedlessly expose himself to known peril by attempting to
cross in front of the train: H. C.-Rd. v. Neubeur, 62 Md. 391;
Parkerv. Rd., 86 N. C. 221; Tetfer v. N. By., 30 N. J. L. 188.
The rule that a person who voluntarily and without necessity exposes himself to a known dahger, although the dangerbe increased by
the act of such person in the face of impending peril, cannot recover,
is also applied to trespassers upon the tracks of railroads. A person
enters upon such tracks at his peril ; the company having an exclusive
right of way, and being under no obligations to intruders upon it.
The company has a right to presume that no one without right will
be upon its track, and also to presume that if any person is seen upon
the same that he will leave it at the last moment, at least, and this
until possibly too late to avoid collision. If, however, the injury,
even to a wrongdoer, be inflicted wilfully or wantonly, or by gross
carelessness under the circumstances of the case, then, although
negligent, the plaintiff may recover: Mason v. Rd., 27 Kans. 83;
Logan v. Rd., 77 Mo. 663; Mulkerrin v. Rd., 81 Penn. St. 366;
Pennsylvania Rd. v. Hummell, 44 Id. 879 ; State v. B. & P. Rd.,
.58 Md. 221, 482; Pennsylvania Rd. v. Sinclair, 62 Ind. 809;
MocCarty v. Jel. &. E. Canal Co., 17 Hun 74; Rounds v. Del.,
L. 4 TF. Ry., 64 N. Y. 129; Johnson v. Rd., 125 Mass. 75;
Lovett v. Rd., 9 Allen 557; Hurfihy v. Rd., 88 Iowa 539; Colorado
Central Rd. v. Holmes, 5 Col. 197 ; South Western Rd. v. Bankerson, 61 Ga. 114; 17l. Cent. Rd. v. 1etherington, 88 Ill. 510;
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Carter v. Rd., 19 S. C. 20; H. & T. C. Rd. v. Smith, 52 -Tex.
178; B. & 0. Rd. v. Sherman, 80 Gratt. 602; Herring v. Rd.,
10 Ired. L. 402; Manly v. Rd., 74 N. 0. 655; MeClelland v.
Rd., 94 Ind. 276. Especially where walking on trestle-bridges:
.Mason v. Rd., 27 Kans. 83; Tennenbrock v. Rd., 59 Cal. 269;
Rd. v. Greene, 19 Am. & Eng. Rd. Cas. 95 (Ky., 1884). Even
where upon the track at the sufferance or with the permission of the
company, they are subject to all the risks incident to.so hazardous
an undertaking: J. M, & . REd. v. Goldsmith, 47 Ind. 43;
MeLaren v. Rd., 8 Am. & Eng. Rd. Cas. 217 ; Hogan v. Rd., 59
Wis. 139; Fitzpatrick v. Fitchburg Rd., 128 Mass. 13; Austin
v. Rd., 91 Ill. 35; O'Donnell v. Rd., 7 Mo. App. 190.
And the presumptioh applies to deaf mutes, unless their misfortune be known to the employees of the train: Zimmerman v.
Rd., 71 Mo. 476; Cogswell v. Rd., 6 Or. 417; Rd. v. MLaren,
62 Ind. 566; Laicher v. Rd., 28 La. Ann. 320; L. & N . Rd. v.
Cooper, 6 A-i. & Eng. Rd. Cas. 5 (Ky. 1882); Purl v. Rd., 79
Mo. 168; or to insensible or drunken men: _ll. Cent. Rd. v.
.Hutchinson, 47 1ll. 408; South Western By. v. Johnson, 60 Ga.
667; Dinwiddie v. Rd., 9 Lea 309; Yarnalt v. Rd., 75 Mo. 575;
Rd. v. Sympkins, 54 Tex. 614.
The limitation of the rule stated also applies where a person voluntarily, and without necessity, jumps from or upon a railroad train
while in motion. The general rule is, in such cases, that one who
is guilty of such disregard of life and personal safety will, by his
own rashness, defeat a recovery, although hemay honestlybelieve that
he will not be injured in so doing, it being, nevertheless, negligence
to take such risk: MXcorkle v. Rd., 61 Iowa 555; N. &C Rd. v.
Smith, 9 Lea 470; Cent. Rd. v..Letcher, 69 Ala. 106; Secor v. Rd.,
10 Fed. Rep. 15 ; Doughertyv. C.; B. & Q. Rd., 86 Ill.467; 0. &.X. Rd. v. Stratton, 78 Id. 88; L. & AH. S. Rd. v. Bangs, 47 Mich.
470; Rd. v. Hendricks, 26 Ind. 228; Knight v. Pontchartrain
Ry., 23 La. Ann. 462; Hubener v. Rd., 23 Id. 492; Harvey v.
-EasternRy., 116 Mass. 269; Hickey v. Rd., 14 Allen 429; Rd. v.
Schaufler, 75 Ala. 136 ; . t G. N Rd. v. Hassell, 62 Tex. 256 ;
C. W. & AT. Rd. v. Peters, 80 Ind. 168; Rd. v. .Krouse, 30 Ohio
St. 222; St. L., L H. & S. Rd. v. Cantrell, 87 Ark. 519; C. &
A. Rd. v. Randolph, 53 Ill. 510; Jeffersonville Rd. v. Swift, 26
Ind. 459;* Lambeth v. N C. Rd., 66 N. C. 494; Kine v. C. P.
Rd., 37 Cal. 400; Doss v. A., K. & T. Ry., 59 Mo. 27; Swigert

